American Foreign Policy & Japanese Prejudice

Gordon Chang argues that because Japan and Korea see international politics in East Asia as a zero-sum game in which China gains power in the region and influence with the US at the expense of other states, the US should see East Asia this way as well.  He is trying to rebut this good article (pdf) by Brad Glosserman in which he argues that Japan’s view of East Asia is limiting and cuts them off from seeing benefits from greater regional cooperation.  Here’s the money bit:

Tokyo should adopt an inclusive outlook and not feel threatened by improved relations between Washington and Beijing. Just as a positive Japan-China relationship will not threaten Tokyo’s ties to Washington, improved U.S.-China relations need not undermine the U.S.-Japan alliance. The key is ensuring that the U.S. sees the value of an alliance with Japan; one asset will be an improved Japan-China relationship.

Japan, and by extension Chang, has a very limited view of the possibilities of how cooperation and politics can work in East Asia.  Because of historical and cultural reasons, Japan sees itself in constant competition with China and thus gets jealous and resentful when the US  builds up its bilateral relationship with the largest country in the world.   The US, because of its power in the region and especially its influence over Japan, can change this equation.  We could assure Japan that we still value them as our longest standing ally in the region and are trying to move China into a regional system of cooperation, instead of isolating them within East Asia, making them more likely to lash out against their neighbors.  Chang, however, just accepts these Japanese prejudices and assumes that because Japan sees a zero-sum game in East Asia, the US should deal with China in the same way.  What Chang can’t prove is that it’s necessarily true that as we get closer to China, we get farther from Japan, or that their interests are damaged in any meaningful way.  We should be pursuing our priorities in East Asia, and not caving to unenlightened Japanese resentments.

Howley vs Waldron on Singapore

When I read Arthur Walrdon’s contentions post bemoaning the high out-migration rate of native Singaporeans and the high portion of Chinese workers in Singapore, I had a good feeling he was deeply wrong.  But because I don’t know a whole lot about the Singapore’s worker population or its immigration patterns, I didn’t post about it.  Instead, I pointed Kerry Howley to the post and hoped she would apply her real knowledge of migration, Singapore and Southeast Asia to Waldron’s fear of Chinese workers.  Well, she did, and so everyone should now go and read her post.

China’s Stake

Gordon Chang’s post discussing China’s foreign policy stance in the coming year is a great example of the green lantern theory of geopolitics; Chang thinks that it’s not only desirable, but possible, for the US to prevent China from taking a “commanding role in shaping the global order.”  Chang sees it as a weakness that on issues of proliferation, Iran, Sudan and most other global problems which China — because it is the world’s largest country with the fourth largest GDP and the world’s manufacturer — necessarily has a role to play, the US has been trying to enlist their assistance on a non-confrontational basis.  Chang seems to be deluded into thinking that China isn’t a major player on the world scene, and we can just ignore them.  Of course, their aforementioned economic heft and veto spot on the security council make that vision impossible.  The other alternative between covering up our eyes and pretending China isn’t there is pursuing a policy of petty confrontation that Chang supports.  He seems to think that at every possible moment we should be sticking our finger in China’s eye, always exaggerating their threat to world order and the US, and always painting their actions in the most nefarious way possible. Why couldn’t Commentary just stick to the Middle East?

The Chinaman Is Not The Issue Here, Dude*

Morgan Stanley is going the route of many big financial firms: losing a lot of money and then selling a large share of the company to a sovereign investment fund.  In their case, $5 billion for a ten percent stake.  Cue the ignorant sinophobia in 3,2,1….

*sorry, but any excuse for a Lebowski reference is a good one. 

Gordon Chang and The Japanese Vassals

One could very well start an entire blog documenting Gordon Chang’s extreme Sinophobia, specifically his penchant to interpret all slightly odd actions China takes as a sign that they’re trying to conquer East Asia. His most recent burst of rabid Sinonoia concerns China altering a joint diplomatic press communiqué with Japan.  China and Japan had prepared this joint document, and then when China released it, they had deleted two agreed upon points.  While this is certainly odd behavior that Japan has rightfully taken exception to, is it a really a sign of, as Chang claims, “[the]Communist Party’s belief that others must accept its version of reality” or that China “wishes Japan to become a vassal to the great and glorious Chinese state”  Chang, in this very post, points to Japan and China, despite political rockiness (which is partially, though certainly not entirely, Japan’s fault), expanding military ties and increasing financial assistance.  There is also, of course, some $200 billion in bilateral trade and $6.5 billion in Japanese foreign direct investment.  Not to mention the extreme economic and defense imbalances between Japan and China — China is much, much poorer than we previously thought.  Oh yeah, and the US defense umbrella we provide to Japan. So it’s unclear what China has to gain from hawkishness, compared to what they could lose.

So why does Gordon Chang chose to interpret a minor diplomatic oddity as a sign of China’s intents to conquer East Asia and make Japan a vassal state?   It seems like this all comes down to interpretation. If you’re like Chang and are convinced that China’s intentions are expansionist and malevolent, you’ll then interpret everything China does as just another sign of their ill intentions.  If you, on the other hand, think that China is a “poor, vulnerable country that’s done pretty well by relying on the delicate latticework of international trade, but that could go up in smoke very quickly” which always has more to gain from cooperation than from brinksmanship or expansionism, then you won’t freak out over incidents like this one.

Talk is Cheap: China and the EU

Before 9/11, William Kristol and much of the militaristic right was talking about the emerging threat of China in military, political and economic realms. As Francis Fukuyama remembered, “There was actually a deliberate search for an enemy because they felt that the Republican Party didn’t do as well.” Gordon Chang is back at it, fulminating against China for no reason:

Mandelson’s address and Sarkozy’s criticism come on the eve of the 10th China-European Union summit. Despite the fact that Beijing just placed large orders with Airbus and France’s Areva, observers say that the discussions this week in the Chinese capital will be tense. “For Europe, the ‘China honeymoon’ is over,” writes David Shambaugh of George Washington University.

We may think that Europeans are effete and spineless, but when was the last time someone from the Bush administration publicly told the Chinese off in their own capital? American officials like to speak about working cooperatively with China to solve “concerns,” while the Europeans are venting frustrations after years of useless dialogue. The welcomed departures of Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder mark a change of mood in the heart of the EU. Perhaps President Bush should now take his cue from the new version of Old Europe.

Chang is celebrating Sarkozy, who went into Beijing and talked some smack to Hu Jintao about intellectual property, the currency and human rights. What’s weird is that Sarkozy, and also Mendelson complaining about product safety, haven’t actually pursued any policy changes. For Chang, it is worth celebrating whenever leaders simply talk tough to the Chinese.

Chang’s post is schizophrenic, he mentions yet ignores the fact that the EU is still pursuing high-level commercial ties with China, specifically the deal with Airbus. Isn’t it weird that a magazine who devotes much of its pages to decrying the utility of negotiating with Iran is so desperate to seek out confrontation with China that they’ll go head over heals when European leaders get blustery for domestic consumption. I wonder what Commentary thought about Gerhard Schroeder anti-American pose he put on for the German public. The parallels are obvious.

China, Sudan and a Pony

Gordan Chang is indignant at the thought of Chinese peacekeepers in Sudan. He notes, correctly, that China has very close ties to the government in Khartoum. The basic exchange is that China gives Sudan infrastructure investment and weapons, and get oil in exchange. It seems natural to complain that a peacekeeping force with a substantial Chinese contingent isn’t a peacekeeping force at all. Unfortunately for Chang, there simply isn’t any other way to go. For better or for worse, Sudan gets to set the terms of any UN presence within its borders. The only non-western states they’ll tolerate are Pakistan and China. If you want the operation to have competent engineers acceptable to Sudan, than China is the only way to go. Fulminating against the “Chinese going there wearing the blue berets and scarves of the United Nations” isn’t very productive. If you want a standard UN PKO going on in Sudan, this is how it’s going to be.

What Should We Do, Robert Kagan?

Robert Kagan eulogizes the belief that economic growth makes liberal transition inevitable(sidenote - Kagan is clearly referencing Fukuyama’s book, and even puts the word “recognition” in quotes — recognition, of course, being a key part of Fukuyama’s Hegel-by-way-of Kojeve synthesis — but can’t actually say the words “End of History” or “Fukuyama”…weird) by pointing out that autocracies in China, Russia and Venezuela are increasingly stable.

This analysis is specious for a few reasons. The first is that the “backslide” in Russia and Venezuela (neither of which were ever outposts of liberalism and democracy) can mostly be explained by two factors, both of which aren’t in any way structural: high oil prices and charismatic, savvy leaders. Neither of these can explain why the general thesis of Fukuyama — that as countries get richer and develop a prosperous middle class, they will eventually transition to a more liberal democratic system — is wrong.

The second problem is that he refuses to lay out any solid policy proposal in keeping with his thesis that democracy must precede development and institution building (it’s also worth pointing out that he criticizes Fareed Zakaria’s notion that “liberal autocrats” are a stepping stone to liberal democracy, but refuses to actually say his name). He makes vague allusions to policies that entail we “confront autocracies and demand that they hold free and fair elections.” But what does that mean, in practice? Does Kagan suggest we refuse to trade with China until they democratize? He seems to imply that we should fault the Chinese for not both lifting hundreds of millions of people out of desperate poverty AND democratizing all at the same time. What about Russia, how do we “confront” them while at the same time extract cooperation over Iran? Kagan can’t tell us. The only policies we know that he favors to “confront” autocracy are the misguided Concert of Democracies and invading Iraq. So maybe he shouldn’t elaborate any policy options, considering how bad his track record is.

China and Burma

Roger Cohen thinks that the road to Yangon runs through Beijing.  It’s become a common refrain that if only China cared enough about the suffering Buddhist monks, then this entire ugly military dictatorship would be scurrying off into exile. Cohen supports this case with some tenuous “facts”:

The Burmese troubles are troubling to China for several reasons. They are on its doorstep. They come in a country transformed in recent years into a virtual client state, where the Chinese are building roads, burning forests, backing gas projects and dreaming of long-coveted access to the Indian Ocean.

First, let’s point out that China has similar relations with nearly every developing country - just because a China is investing in a country’s infrastructure and natural resources, that doesn’t make it a Chinese “client state.”  Who’s Burma’s biggest trading partner? Thailand.  Who are the two biggest investors in Burmese oil and gas?  Thailand and India.

Kerry Howlely dispelled the myth that we can somehow bully China into dealing with the malicious Burmese government.  I’ll summarize her piece: every Burma expert says that China has very limited leverage on the government which has been doing everything it can in since 1988 to isolate itself from the rest of the world.

Cohen points out that China has been integral in pressuring another hermit state, North Korea, to giving into foreign demands.  Of course, it’s much easier to deal with a problem that threatens the whole of East Asia, as opposed to one that, while awful, is truly a Burmese matter.  Cohen even admits that “I don’t think Olympic boycotts work; nor do I think a breakdown in Chinese-American relations serves anyone.”  Well then, does Cohen think it’s a good idea to try to bully China into doing something that it both does not and can not do?  If he thinks that the most commonly suggested means of pressure aren’t advisable, then why did he write the column in the first place?

Ahmadinejad, Khrushchev, and Hu Jintao

Rick Perlstein has written a great description of Krushchev’s state visit to the US in 1959.  In short, there wasn’t this bizarre feeling of trepidation.  Instead, he got to go to LA, have a white tie dinner with the President Eisenhower, recieved a 21 gun salute, hung out with the CIA, talked to a bunch of business leaders, went to the National Press Club and a whole host of treats that we probably wouldn’t even dole out to Tony Blair these days.  What gives?

Ezra diagnoses the problem as being massive American insecurity due to not being popular in the world anymore — so we now fear tinpot dictators instead of trying to impress them.  But the comparison between Ahmadinejad and Khruschev isn’t very instructive, because Ahmadinejad isn’t even the head of a state middling regional power.  Khruschev, on the other hand, was in charge of the world’s other super power and thus deserved the attention of the American government for his UN visit.

The more instructive comparison would he Hu Jintao’s visit in April of 2006.  As Dana Milbank recounted, Hu Jintao got a similar reception to Khrushchev:

He got the 21-gun salute, the review of the troops and the Colonial fife-and-drum corps. He got the exchange of toasts and a meal of wild-caught Alaskan halibut with mushroom essence, $50 chardonnay and live bluegrass music. And he got an Oval Office photo op with President Bush, who nodded and smiled as if he understood Chinese while Hu spoke.

Of course, even during that visit, the White House called China the “Republic of China” which is Taiwan’s official name, allowed a Falun Gong journalist to heckle Hu for three minutes and Dick Cheney wearing sunglasses for a ceremony (apparently that isn’t cool in China).  The real issue was not giving Hu Jintao a state dinner, and instead a “luncheon”.   That could probably be chalked up to Bush’s distaste for such events, but the comparison is still there.  In the 50s, with Khrushchev, it didn’t matter if the President didn’t like state dinners, when the leader of the second most important country in the world came over for a visit, that’s just what you did.  And you didn’t freak out when someone like Ahmadinejad soiled your shores.

Defending Mattel’s Apology to China

Mattel issued a public apology to China for the entire design flaw/lead toys debacle. Some are reading this as China being nefarious and forcing Mattel to do some Maoist style self criticism if they want to continue manufacturing in China. But Mattel probably does, in a platonic sense, owe China an apology. When the lead toys story broke, the villain wasn’t Mattel, but China — as if an entire country could be villainous. The backlash wasn’t against Mattel, no Senators suggested that all of Mattel’s imports –from every country — be exhaustively and selectively searched and inspected. No opportunistic journalists, advocates or politicians used the story to advance an anti-Mattel agenda, or at least Mattel skepticism. Of the 17.4 million units recalled only 2.2 million had lead paint, the other 15 million units were recalled because of a Mattel design flaw — not a “Chinese” one. So Mattel designs unsafe toys - remember, they are based in El Segundo, Ca - and the story that comes out is how China is so greedy as to endanger The Children with their unsafe toys.

Another point — China doesn’t make toys, Chinese manufacturers and Western companies do. So yes, Mattel screwed up, and screwed China — more than themselves — in the process. Damn right they should apologize.

H/T - Garance

Read the Washington Post’s write up on the apology

Democracies and Dictatorships and Women in Government

Garance Franke-Ruta snarkily digests this Reuters article lamenting the lack of women in Chinese government. While it is a little funny that Reuters would represent 20% female representation in parliament as some kind of great problem afflicting a non democracy, while the US can’t get 20% in our own congress, Garance’s commentary also shows the downside of a too intense focus on the number of women in power.

One large difference between China’s parliament and our Congress is that, well, our Congress is elected by people and has real powers. Our congress also allows multiple parties. So while we may have proportionally fewer parliamentary women, they actually have power vis a vis the executive branch (hypothetically anyway). It’s also possible to gain real power (for men and women) in the United States through paths that don’t go through the legally mandated, single Communist party.

This also brings up one of the least enlightening statistics or examples about women in government people bandy around. Oftentimes it’s pointed out that so and so country has had a female head of government or state while the backwards United States has not. And while I think that we ought to have more women in government, if for no other reason than that political talent and intelligence is probably distributed roughly equally among the sexes and so smart women aren’t in government while some dumb men are, I don’t think it is very indicative of anything that Pakistan has had a female Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, and we haven’t had a female president. Is Pakistan better off than us, in any way? It’s worth pointing off that in parts of Pakistan, women are sentenced to gang rape by tribal courts. And while rape and the legal system in America is hardly perfect, it sure isn’t as bad as in Pakistan. The question we should really be asking is whether or not women, as a class, can pursue careers in government and elected service without debilitating personal and societal constraints. The US hardly passes with flying colors in this respect, but it’s still a better evaluative criterion than gross numbers of women in power.

The problem with a democracy is that it will only be able to accept as many women in power as the people and society are willing to support freely.  This means that legal equality and “representative” equality (a dodgy category on its own) will not always be in perfect accordance with each other.   China doesn’t have these same fetters of people picking their own leaders, and it’s not better off for it, for women or anyone.

Sinophobic Wankery Watch - Seagate Edition

The large scale investment of foreign nations in high profile wester assets all too often breeds a reflexive, uninformed xenophobic and protectionist response - just look at the ugliness following the CNOOC-Unocal and Dubai Ports deals. There’s also the sneering, fearful undercurrent of concern with sovereign wealth funds from export rich country flush in dollars daring to invest their money - like China’s stake in Blackstone and Singapore’s investment in Barclays. Of course, no one can put forth a coherent case why investing in western banks or investment firms is any different than investing in currency, but certain actors fear of the foreign is quite profound.

In what is sure to be the next xenophobic fear-o-thon by the Dobbs of the world is a Chinese company’s bid to buy American disk drive manufacturer Seagate:

Although disk drives do not fall under a list of export-controlled technologies, the attempted purchase of an American disk drive company would require a security review by the federal government, according to several government officials.

In recent years, modern disk drives, used to store vast quantities of digital information securely, have become complex computing systems, complete with hundreds of thousands of lines of software that are used to ensure the integrity of data and to offer data encryption.

That could raise the prospect of secret tampering with hardware or software to make it possible to pilfer information via computer networks, intelligence officials have warned.

This looks like quite a thin concern - are the Chinese going to steal all of our packets and information using their super secret disk drive technology that Seagate already has? Isn’t it worth pointing out that US phone companies are already transferring our communications to the NSA, shouldn’t that be a bit bigger concern than a Chinese company selling hard drives? Is there any evidence of the Chinese using other formerly American technology assets like Lenovo for nefarious purposes? Shouldn’t we be correcting for anti-foreign bias instead of seemingly searching for a reason to impede the free exchange between a Chinese company and Seagate’s stockholders?

The article also mentions concerns about “competitiveness” - which is a mostly BS concept. Seagate isn’t an “American company” - it’s owned and controlled by its stockholders. Countries don’t produce things - companies do. Countries don’t have incomes - people do. And even if you do talk about “national shares of wealth” - the American people would certainly be better off if, say, our wealth could increase 2% while China’s increased 5% - sure, our “competitiveness” would take a hit, but we’d be better off.

Seagate’s stock price ticked up with this news, so unless someone can put forth a very, very good reason why this deal shouldn’t go through, then we should let the Seagate stockholders do what the see fit with their company.

Chinese Regulation

More like self regulation, seeing that the head of Lee Deer Industrial Company offed himself all on his own:

The head of a Chinese company that was behind the recall earlier this month of more than a million Mattel toys committed suicide over the weekend, China’s state-controlled media reported today.

Zhang Shuhong, a Hong Kong businessman and owner of the Lee Der Industrial Company, a company that made toys for Mattel for 15 years, hanged himself in a company warehouse in Foshan, in southern China, the Southern Metropolis Daily said today.

I find this oddly reassuring, along with the execution of the head of China’s FDA - which both show that China is serious, deadly serious, about making their products safe for international consumption.  They clearly have a long way to go on the corruption front, but at least they’re willing to acknowledge that it’s a problem, and they have companies and executives who understand the stakes.  This should be viewed as a harbinger of China’s willingness to play by the rules in all spheres in which it would benefit them, and a sign that people should try to calm down on the sinophobia and understand that all China wants is economic growth and political stability - not to poison our children or any nonsense like that.