Moral Preening Didn’t Help Anyone
In the wake of Cyclone Nargis, there were two distinct, though related, forms of moral preening. One form were those calling for some sort of armed intervention or forced delivery of humanitarian aid. Although that option wasn’t in the realm of possibility, it was annoying insomuch as it let people simply blame the “UN” or the “international community” for the development of an incredibly complex and bewildering problem. The second annoying preening came from many in the humanitarian community – most notably Bernard Kouchner – who didn’t demand just that foreign aid workers be allowed into Burma, but that their (read: European and, really, French) workers be permitted access. And while it would be nice if Burma weren’t ruled by paranoid thugs, that was the reality we were forced to deal with.
Burma was, surprisingly enough, relatively willing to let relief workers from ASEAN countires in, and not surprisingly, it turns out that France didn’t have a monopoly on skilled aid workers, especially those who could best help people in South Asia. John Holmes, the UN official in charge of humanitarian work and emergency relief, praises the ASEAN aid workers in a Post op-ed:
Third, Nargis showed us a new model of humanitarian partnership, adding the special position and capabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to those of the United Nations in working effectively with the government. This may prove the most important — and, I hope, enduring — lesson of the cyclone response, with implications for how we respond, anywhere, in the future.
ASEAN’s leadership was vital in building trust with the government and saving lives. In recent years, ASEAN members have significantly stepped up participation in the humanitarian arena.
Matt Lee makes this point pretty strongly, and even argues that France (and others) very public insistence that their aid workers go in allowed them to overlook the fact that Burma was getting 20-25 percent of the cash aid through crooked exchange rates. Because the aid workers were such a sticking point, Lee contends, the donors didn’t have any leverage to insist that Burma not steal so much of the money.
A seperate thing that we all got wrong in Burma was the scope of the disaster. We can all agree that 140,000 dead and the 2.4 million “affected” are way too many, but it’s worth remembering that in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone, humanitarian groups like Oxfam were speculating that up to 1.5 million people were at risk for water borne disease. Holmes reports that the much-hyped spectre of secondary, water borne disease never came to be.
David Rieff was very skeptical at the time, saying that such dire warnings were de rigeuer for humanitarian groups; and were nearly always wrong. It makes sense that they sex up the numbers – they get more money and support if disasters are perceived as bigger, and there’s a very pronounced tendency among westerners to underestimate how resilient people can be in the face of natural or man made horror.
