What Would Happen If We Withdraw?
Mark Lynch has a very thoughtful and thorough look at the political consequences for the major factions in Iraq – green zone politicians, Sunni insurgents, Sadrites and Shiites and Al Qaeda. There’s not a whole lot to add, except to note his strong opinion that what the Surge has accomplished – the weakening of the central government and the further factionalization of Iraq – does not make the prospects for withdrawal any rosier:
The single most important question shaping the possibility of US withdrawal is whether it takes place in the context of a relatively strong, competent and effectively sovereign Iraqi state. US strategy should be oriented towards producing that core condition. The strategic failure of the “surge” has been that it has eroded the capacity and sovereignty of the Iraqi state by building up mutually hostile armed groups outside national institutions. The US must work to strengthen state institutions, and to force the integration of the Awakening Councils into the national army and police in advance of its withdrawal in order to avoid sectarian warfare. Despite the current American fashion in favor of decentralization, Iraqi support for a centralized Iraqi state remains strong: in last month’s BBC survey, 66% of Iraqis preferred a unified Iraq with a strong central government, while only 23% favored the federation of strong regional governments.
A withdrawal will be more likely to produce positive effects if it is preceded by building Iraqi national institutions and mobilizing regional support. The most vulnerable remaining populations should be protected as long as possible. Intra-communal power struggles will likely be increasingly significant flashpoints with or without a US withdrawal, but will likely intensify in anticipation of a withdrawal which would likely significantly weaken the current ruling elite. I do not expect a withdrawal to proceed smoothly, given the legacy of five years of wrong paths, mismanagement, and sectarian violence. But it is also not impossible, especially if steps are taken now to improve the odds, and it is made more likely by a credible commitment to withdrawal.
This brings up the real question for a Democratic administration. Are we too far down the road of a degraded Iraqi state and set of political institutions to hope that a change in US policy could every actually get us to a place where we our withdrawal would have fewer negative effects than it would now? And, would it be worth the strategic oppurtunity costs and the loss of American life and treasure to try and reach this point?
While Lynch is hopeful that we could push towards centralization because large numbers of Iraqis support a strong centralized state, it’s worth noting that 34% don’t – much higher numbers than you’ll find in any well-ordered country. Also, Lynch’s conditions for a strong state that we could properly withdraw from with minimal negative consequences may be slightly fantastical. For instance, he says that we have to “force the integration of the Awakening Councils into the national army and police in advance of its withdrawal in order to avoid sectarian warfare.” At the moment, there seems to be little reason that the Shiites who largely dominate the police and army would want to accept the Sunni Awakening Councils or why the Councils would want to lose their autonomy and support by entering into an Army that is staffed by their enemies. If this really is the “lynchpin” (haha) for achieving a “successful” withdrawal, then I think we should just withdraw now. Our policies have gone too far in encouraging the dissolution of any sucessful Iraqi state and the only large enough shock to the system would actually be a credible plan for withdrawal, as Lynch himself says:
No Iraqi actor would scream more loudly or offer more dire warnings of impending doom than the current Green Zone elite – and, not coincidentally, these are the voices most often heard in Washington and by politicians on short visits to Baghdad. But their warnings should be understood at least in part as expressions of their own political self-interest. No Iraqi actor is more likely to quickly readjust its behavior and calculations should such a withdrawal be announced. With the US set to depart, the whole range of national reconciliation initiatives which are currently seen as at best luxuries and at worst mortal threats would suddenly become a much more intense matter of self-interest. The integration of the Sunni Awakenings, for instance, would move from a challenge to Shia hegemony over the security forces into the best possible way to pre-empt their military challenge. The credible commitment to withdrawal would give the US much-needed leverage over the Green Zone leadership.
From reading this paragraph, it looks like planning for, and then executing, a withdrawal would hit two birds with one stone. For one, it would probably be the only move extreme enough to reverse the poor strategy of the surge and supporting the Anbar Awakening at the expense of centralization, and it would also get us out of Iraq. This may seem tautalogical, but I think it’s still useful: only a withdrawal can create the conditions that would allow for withdrawal.
